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CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS AND 
IMPLICATIONS OF FEDERAL COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING LEGISLATION FOR STATE 
AND LOCAL EMPLOYEES 
*Ronald C. Brown 
If a State is engaging in economic activities that are validly 
regulated by the Federal Government when engaged in by 
private persons, the State too may be forced to conform its 
activities to federal regulation.• · 
To many observers of public sector collective bargaining, this 
pronouncement by the Supreme Court laid to rest meaningful 
discussion of whether the federal government has the constitu-
tional authority to pass collective bargaining legislation for 
state and local employees. Yet significant constitutional ques-
tions remain unresolved as to the appropriate relationship be-
tween state and federal governments, the scope of the com-
merce clause of the Constitution which permits federal regula-
ti<m of state matters, and the degree to which the internal 
affairs of a state can be regulated before that regulation unduly 
interferes with the state's sovereignty. 
Additionally, even if constitutional authority for such bar-
gaining legislation exists, further constitutional and legal ques-
tions will need resolution before a federal bargaining statute 
can be enacted. For example, the issue of federal preemption 
of state and local laws relating to working conditions and em-
ployment benefits would need special attention to determine 
which, if any, such laws would be displaced or whether those 
laws cover proper subjects for bargaining. The permissibility of 
strikes by public employees would need careful examination to 
determine whether or to what degree they could be regulated 
without improperly infringing on first amendment rights; also 
to be determined is the question of whether such alternatives 
as binding interest arbitration will survive constitutional scru-
• B.S., J.D., University of Toledo; L.L.M., University of Michigan. Professor Brown 
is currently a P~ofessor of Law, College of William and Mary. 
1. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 197 (1968). On June 24, 1976, the Court handed 
down its decision in National League of Cities u. Dunlop; for a discussion of the impact 
of this recent case on Maryland u. Wirtz and this article, see note 121 supra. 
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tiny. A multitude of such issues exist and await creative legis-
lative or judicial guidance to finalize the form of future public 
sector collective bargaining legislation. This article will assess 
the constitutional authority for federal bargaining legislation, 
raise and analyze some of the many constitutional implications 
which such legislation would have on state and local govern-
mental employers, and suggest means by which the natural 
tensions between federal and state governments might be mini-
mized. 
The need for examination and resolution of the constitu-
tional issues raised by federal bargaining law flows from the 
recent explosive developments in public sector labor relations. 
Not only has the number of public employees increased dra-
matically, from ten to fifteen million in the past decade, but 
the number of union members has increased to the point where 
almost a third of state and local employees are under union 
agreements and about three million employees are union mem-
bers. 2 And rapid growth of state bargaining legislation has oc-
curred so that forty states now have some type of legislation 
covering some of their public employees.3 
Notwithstanding this flurry of legislative activity, arguments 
persist that only about one-half of the state legislation can be 
described as comprehensive in coverage and in obligations. The 
remainder is largely of the piecemeal, gap-filling variety that 
has been passed in response to demands by special interest 
groups such as firefighters or teachers. 4 Even in those states 
2. Hearings on H.R. 12532, H.R. 7684, and H.R. 9324 Before the Special Subcom-
mittee on Education and Labor, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 70, 71 (1972) [hereinafter cited 
as Hearings]. 
3. For a summary of state labor laws, see BNA GoVERNMENT EMPLOYEES RELATIONS 
REPORT [hereinafter cited as GERR],. RF 51:501-523 (1975); and see Blair, State 
Legislative Control over the Conditions of Public Employment: Defining the Scope of 
Collective Bargaining for State and Municipal Employees, 26 VAND. L. REv. 3-4 & n.18 
(1973); and see Hearings, supra note 2, at 132-34. 
4. States having legislation covering all or most public employees with one or more 
statutes include Alaska, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Massachu-
setts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, 
North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Vermont and Wisconsin. GERR, 
supra note 3; and see GERR RF 51:1011 et seq. (1974). States with separate legislation 
covering teachers include Alaska, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Indiana, 
Kansas, Maryland, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, 
Vermont and Washington. Id. States with legislation covering policemen and/or fire-
fighters include Alabama, Georgia, Idaho, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, 
Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas and Wyoming. ld. 
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without express statutory authorization to engage in collective 
bargaining, that authority may and often does exist in the con-
stitutional right to form and join unions and the implied statu-
tory authority to enter into negotiated agreements. 5 Full nego-
tiation usually occurs, however, only after the authority issues 
have been litigated. And inchoate, frequently extralegal rela-
tionships result which are not necessarily legally enforceable, 
are not regulated by a statutory scheme, and are not, therefore, 
always in the public interest inasmuch as important public 
rights can be compromised in the absence of legislative limita-
tion and guidance. Proponents of 'federal legislation point to 
these developments as evidence of the states' default by estab-
lishing only minimal bargaining rights for most state and local 
public employees. Thus, they have turned to the federal gov-
ernment for a legislative solution.8 
Congress has responded by holding public hearings on the 
question of the need for·, and the- form of, federal collective 
bargaining legislation. Although several different bills have 
been introduced, attention has recently been focused on two 
bills. One would create a new agency to administer a separate 
national public employment relations program, 7 and the other 
would amend the National Labor Relations Act to include the 
now excluded public employees.8 In 1975-76, supporters of the 
5. For example in Virginia, a non-statutory state, it is estimated that a third of the 
state's teachers are under collective bargaining arrangements. For an example of recent 
case law supporting the implied authority to negotiate, see Dayton Classroom Teachers 
Ass'n v. Dayton Bd. ofEduc., 41 Ohio St. 2d 127,323 N.E.2d 714 (1975); East Chicago 
Teachers, Union Local 511 v. Board of Trustees, 153 Ind. ·App. 463, 287 N.E.2d 891 
(1972). See generally Dole, State and Local Public Employee Collective Bargaining in 
the Absence of Explicit Legislative Authorization, 54 IowA L. REv. 539 (1969) 
[hereinafter cited as Dole]. 
6. AFSCME President Jerry Wurf, representative of the proponents of federal legis-
lation, has stated: 
No pattern prevails among the 50 states and 80,000 local government units 
save one-that public employees are always in an inferior, secondary class 
status compared to workers in private industry. 
GERR No. 548, at B-16 (1974). 
7. H.R. 8677 (National Public Employees Relations Act), 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) 
(H.R. 1488, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1974)). 
8. H.R. 77, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). The same bill was introduced earlier asH .R. 
12532, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), and in the Senate as S. 3294. GERR No. 549, at B-
8 (1974). For general discussion of the appropriateness and alternatives of federal 
legislation, see Brown, Federal Legislation For Public Sector Collective Bargaining: A 
Minimum Standards Approach, 5 U. TOLEDO L. REv. 681 (1974) [hereinafter cited as 
Brown]. 
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first bill shifted their allegiance to the second, so that presently 
there is only one supported bill before Congress. 9 Since the time 
of the public hearings, action on the bill has proceeded slowly. 
This is due in part to the bill's controversial nature in an elec-
tion year and in larger part to the hope that the Supreme 
Court, in ruling on the appropriate degree of federal involve-
ment in state labor relations under the Fair Labor Standards 
Act, will by analogy give needed guidance on the constitutional 
issues raised by proposed federal bargaining legislation. 10 
I. FEDERALISM AND FEDERAL REGULATION OF STATE AND 
LOCAL LABOR RELATIONS 
In addition to examining the authority of the federal govern-
ment to intervene in state labor relations, the conceptual im-
pact of that intervention upon our system of federalism ought 
to be considered.U Federalism has long had a vital influence on 
the pattern of American constitutional development and it has 
been characterized as "the means and price of the formation 
of the Union," 12 Beyond that political reality, it is useful to 
identify the values it was designed to serve and to outline how 
it has been accommodated to the national interest of protecting 
9. The National Education Association (NEA) has continued to modify its position. 
In 1972 it supported categorical bargaining legislation for teachers. In 1973 it changed 
its support to omnibus legislation with its president stating before the House Commit-
tee hearing testimony on H.R. 8677: 
Our experience has convinced us that similarities among the various catego-
ries of public employees outweigh the dissimilarities and that there are cer-
tain well recognized principles and procedures that should be uniformly 
applied to all public employees. 
Contained in a booklet on testimony on H.R. 8677 prepared by Coalition of American 
Public Employees 24 (1973). NEA has now endorsed H.R. 77. 
10. National League of Cities v. Dunlop, No. 74-878 (U.S. filed Jan. 17, 1975) and 
California v. Brennan, No. 74-879 (U.S. filed Jan. 17, 1975). Both cases have been 
argued, and a decision is imminent. 
11. Arguments relating to the propriety of bargaining legislation and its appropriate 
form, i.e., whether or not to treat government as just another industry or to accomodate 
its constitutional, legislative, financial, political and market differences will be set 
aside from this discussion of the constitutional appropriateness of federal legislation. 
Such arguments are summarized in Brown, supra note 8, at 684-86; and see Rhemus, 
Constraints on Local Governments in Employee Bargaining, 67 MICH. L. REv. 919 
(1969). 
12. Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in "the 
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 CoLUM. L. REv. 543 (1954). 
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and promoting interstate commerce 13 and to the tenth amend-
ment of the Constitution.l4 
A. Federalism 
The problem of allocating powers between nation and state 
has often been couched in terms of the efficiency of a national 
approach to problems versus the danger of a central govern-
ment's accumulating excessive power to the detriment of the 
interests of the states. On the question of federal collective 
bargaining legislation, the debate continues with opponents of 
federal regulation claiming that vital state interests in labor 
-relations are best left to the control of the states. The claim is 
that intricate balances of varying state and local governmental 
structures require diversity and experimentation to resolve the 
complex problems in state and local governmental employee 
relations; solutions are necessarily going to be very different 
from state to state. Therefore, to devise national uniform legis-
lation and to impose it upon the states would work to violate 
the basic tenets of federalism. 
Proponents of federal legislation maintain that important 
employee rights of self-determination in labor relations are 
being sacrificed during this ongoing period of "experimenta-
tion" by the states. In addition, they maintain that experi-
ments with bargaining legislation by the states have already 
produced a recognizable set of minimum standards such as 
secret ballot elections, employee free choice and prohibited 
practices. Other controversial matters such as strikes, interest 
arbitration, and bargaining by supervisors will most likely 
never be resolved by the states. 
Whether diversity would be displaced by a federal law is also 
disputed by proponents of the law. Certainly the National 
Labor Relations Act has not produced bland uniformity and 
13. Justice Johnson made the Supreme Court's position clear many years ago when 
he observed in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824): 
If there was any one object riding over every -Other in- the adoption of the 
Constitution, it was to keep the commercial intercourse among the States 
free from all invidious and partial restraints. 
14. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohib-
ited by it to the States are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. 
CoNST. amend. X. 
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non-innovative collective bargaining practices. Experience il-
lustrates that divergent practices have developed in particular 
industries such as construction, trucking, and the garment in-
dustries and that bargaining structures and strategies remain 
diverse. Proponents maintain, therefore, that special occupa-
tional groups in the public sector such as firefighters, teachers 
or social workers would hardly sacrifice their unique character-
istics, which could be preserved by specific statutory provisions 
for different appropriate bargaining units and bargaining 
structures. 
B. Sovereignty 
An essential aspect of federalism, in addition to its planned 
maintenance of diversity, is the concept of sovereignty. Al-
though the legal ramifications of sovereignty will be discussed 
subsequently, the conceptual ramifications need also be ad-
dressed. The premise of the state sovereignty argument in the 
context of federal public sector bargaining legislation is that 
state governments' decisions on matters of vital state interest 
must be shielded from federal intervention. To permit federal 
interference with matters constitutionally entrusted to the 
states, such as the general welfare of its citizens, including its 
employees, and to compel it to bargain with its citizens on 
various matters, tends to undercut if not to abrogate the con-
cept of sovereignty. Sovereignty in this sense denotes immuniz-
ing and insulating against outside tampering with constitution-
ally based structures of state and local government. 15 The con-
ceptuallimitation on federal intervention is of fading practical 
significance and to a great degree has been supplanted by judi-
cial constructions of the commerce clause of the Constitution. 
These interpretations tend to negate lingering concepts of dual 
federalism raised in conjunction with the tenth amendment. 18 
15. An argument related to sovereignty, though more legal in nature, involves ques· 
tions of illegal delegation of authority absent permission or authorizing legislation from 
the state government such as when a government employer negotiates with its employ-
ees absent explicit statutory authorization or permits a third party to settle disputes. 
Although cases finding delegation problems are becoming infrequent, illustration of 
the principle can be found in Mugford v. Mayor & City Council, 185 Md. 266, 44 A.2d 
745 (1945). See also Dole, supra note 5; and McAvoy, Binding Arbitration of Contract 
Terms: A New Approach to the Resolution of Disputes in the Public Sector, 72 CoLUM. 
L. REV. 1192 (1972). 
16. For a discussion on the concept that state powers limit the national power, i.e., 
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C. Default By States Necessitating and Providing a Rational 
Basis for Federal Legislation 
Experience has shown that, especially in the area of labor 
legislation, when the states fail to meet a perceived public 
need, the federal government may move to fill that need. Ex-
amples are laws which cover minimum wage, unemployment 
compensation, occupational safety and health, civil rights and 
private sector labor relationsY Thus, allocation of authority 
between national and state governments has on numerous oc-
casions been in favor of the federal government. Close ques-
tions are influenced by the pragmatic assessment that if regu-
lation is to come, the sophisticated distinctions of federalism 
must yield to permit a more efficacious solution to major prob-
lems ineptly or inadequately managed by the states. 
A brief assessment of legislative developments in state and 
local labor relations shows that a substantial amount of new 
legislation has been enacted in the past five years and that 
additional legislation is forthcoming. 18 However, it is equally 
clear that less than half of the nearly forty recent statutes could 
reasonably be categorized as comprehensive. 19 Many statutes 
cover only special interest groups such as teachers or fire-
fighters2" and fewer than a fourth of the total require collective 
bargaining for all employees should the employees choose to 
bargain. 21 Neither is the use of administrative machinery to 
administer the acts uniformly established. Only a small per-
centage of states have created a new agency to administer their 
laws, while others use existing agencies such as state boards of 
"dual federalism," see generally A. MASON, THE SuPREME CouRT: PALLADIUM OF 
FREEDOM 116-18 (1962). The essentials of the doctrine have been summarized as: 
(1) The national government is one of enumerated powers only; (2) Also, the 
purposes which it may constitutionally promote are few; (3) Within their 
respective spheres the two centers of government are "sovereign," and hence 
"equal"; (4) The relation of the two centers with each other is one of tension 
rather than collaboration. 
Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1, 4 (1950). 
17. For a clear description of federal intervention due to state inaction in unemploy-
ment compensation, see Larson & Murray, The Development of Unemployment Insur-
ance in the United States, 8 VAND. L. REv. 181, 185 (1955). 
18. See note 3, supra. 
19. See Brown, supra note 8, at 696-97. 
20. ld. 
21. /d. See Hearings, supra note 2, at 283. For a more detailed analysis, see GERR, 
supra notes 3 & 4. 
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education. Seven states permit local employers rather than an 
agency to determine the appropriate bargaining unit. 22 State 
labor relations legislation has also covered representation ques-
tions, bargaining obligations, impasse procedures, strike reso-
lution and union security arrangements, some of which show 
great innovation and experimentation. Patterns of legislation 
have emerged which are sufficient to permit description and 
provide future guidance as to the minimum acceptable stan-
dards in those states which have passed legislation. This 
guidance could prove invaluable in the drafting or interpreting 
of a federal public sector bargaining law should the federal 
government be found constitutionally authorized to pass such 
a law. 
In those states without applicable legislation the courts have 
been called upon to protect the organizational rights of employ-
ees who choose to unionize, contributing to a growing corpus 
of common law public sector labor relations. For example, in 
nonstatutory states, extra-legal, de facto bargaining relation-
ships have developed as a result of courts' holdings that there 
is a constitutional right to organize. In addition, although there 
is no constitutional right to bargain, there may well be an 
implied statutory right of the employer to bargain if he so 
chooses.23 
Thus, a preliminary assessment of legislative enactments by 
the states leads to the conclusion that the states have not done 
enough to refute the argument that they have defaulted by 
inaction and underregulation. 24 This argument provides the 
constitutionally necessary "rational basis" for federal legisla-
22. Hearings, supra note 2, at 284; and see Smith, State and Local Advisory Reports 
on Public Employment Labor Legislation: A Comparative Analysis, 67 MICH. L. REv. 
891 (1969). 
23. See Brown, Public Sector Collective Bargaining: Perspective and Legislative 
Opportunities, 15 WM. & MARY L. REv. 57, 79-82 (1973). 
24. Former Secretary of Labor Hodgson in congressional testimony on the question 
of federal legislation stated: 
This lack of experience makes it impossible to adequately evaluate the effi-
ciency and effort of various statutory provisions upon the governmental unit, 
public employees, and public interest. 
Hearings, supra note 2, at 281. AFSCME President Jerry Wurf, speaking to the issue 
of whether diversity and experimentation should be permitted to continue, commented 
that public employees have tired of being the "white rats in a labor-management 
laboratory" and they seek the stability and equity of a federal law. GERR No. 548, at 
B-16 (1974). 
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tion. Analysis of whether legal authority exists for Congress to 
legislate over particular areas neglected by the states, without 
unduly violating the basic structural concepts of federalism or 
improperly interfering with protected areas of sovereignty must 
resolve any question of whether it makes a significant differ-
ence that it is public rather than private employees that would 
be regulated. 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS OF FEDERAL BARGAINING 
LEGISLATION 
Paramount to any discussion of the propriety of federal legis-
lation is a determination of its legality. The authority for the 
federal government to regulate the labor relations of the states 
must be found, if at all, in the United States Constitution 
within the commerce clause and the necessary-and-proper 
clause; the activities of state and local governments must first 
have a sufficient effect on interstate commerce to be a proper 
subject of federal legislation, and second, the legislation will be 
valid only where Congress has a rational basis for its regulatory 
scheme to protect commerce. Additionally, the scope of regula-
tion under the commerce power must not be found to be so 
expansive as to violate any constitutional immunities of the 
states, either by transgressing tenth amendment powers re-
served to the states or by improperly displacing "sovereign" 
powers of the states. These issues as well as the possible effect 
that the eleventh amendment may have in limiting national 
authority to regulate the states will be discussed below. 
A. National Authority Under the Commerce Clause 
The commerce clause creates a national legislative power to 
protect the free flow of interstate commerce which overrides 
powers of the states. 25 Although the principle is generally ac-
cepted, the continuing subject of inquiry is the scope of Con-
gress' power under the clause. Chief Justice Marshall in 1824 
described it as the plenary power to regulate and went on to 
say: 
25. See 1 C. WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CoNSTITUTION 568 (1937); Abel, The 
Commerce Clause in the Constitutional Convention and in Contemporary Comment, 
25 MINN. L. REV. 432 (1941). 
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This power, like all others vested in Congress, is complete in 
itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowl-
edges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the Consti-
tution. 26 
While the Supreme Court for a time departed from Chief 
Justice Marshall's broad definition of power under the com-
merce clause, the modern judicial interpretations have steadily 
expanded its scope, so that the modern commerce power is as 
broad as Marshall's original definition. In recent years the Su-
preme Court has consistently ruled that federal regulation of 
labor relations is a proper constitutional exercise of congres-
sional power under the commerce clause; matters which have 
the potential for obstructing the interstate flow of goods, even 
though involving an employer engaged solely in intrastate ac-
tivities, are subject to federal regulation. 27 In clear language the 
Court has stated: 
The fundamental principle is that the power to regulate com-
merce is the power to enact "all appropriate legislation" for 
"its protection and advancement". . . . Although activities 
may be intrastate in character when separately considered, 
if they have such a close and substantial relation to interstate 
commerce that their control is essential or appropriate to 
protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions, Con-
gre!)s cannot be denied the power to exercise that con-
trol. . . . 28 
The Supreme Court, in testing the limits of the scope of the 
commerce clause, has consistently found that even though the 
regulated activity itself might properly be called intrastate ac-
tivity, where interstate commerce may be affected, it is a pro-
per subject for regulation. 29 Thus, with the distinction between 
intrastate and interstate activity closely drawn, and the au-
thority of Congress under the commerce clause expanded, it 
has been observed: 
26. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824). 
27. See generally P. BENSON, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE, 1937-
1970 (1970). 
28. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Ste~l Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 36-7 (1936); and see United 
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). 
29. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United 
States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224 (1963); 
Polish Nat'l Alliance v. NLRB, 322 U.S. 643 (1944); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 
(1942). 
1976] Constitutional Implications 
It may be true that the application of the principles now 
approved by the Supreme Court may leave only minor as-
pects of an economy free from the regulatory power of Con-
gress. The reason for this, however, is not legal but 
economic.30 (Emphasis added.) 
135 
The Supreme Court has in an increasing number of cases 
indicated that federal regulation of public sector employment 
relations is likewise constitutionally permissible under the 
commerce clause. In 1968 the Court upheld the extension of the 
Fair Labor Standards Act to cover public employees of state-
owned hospitals and schools.31 In 1976, the Supreme Court has 
been asked to resolve the same issues raised in that case in the 
National League of Cities32 case. 
Recent decisions provide insight into the likely outcome of 
the National League of Cities case. For example, the case of Fry 
v. United States33 held that the federal government had consti-
tutional authority to pass the Economic Stabilization Act 
which created an agency which in turn forbade pay increases 
to state employees in Ohio in excess of 7 percent, notwithstand-
ing the state's decision to pay more. Although the arguments 
were stated not in terms of the commerce power, but in terms 
of the limitations on that power imposed by the tenth amend-
ment, Justice Marshall found little difficulty in finding that 
Maryland v. Wirtz was dispositive and that the states were not 
immune from federal regulation under the commerce clause.34 
Even though the scope of the commerce clause may be ex-
tended so as to permit federal regulation of state and local 
employees, questions remain as to whether Congress in passing 
federal bargaining legislation will have based its decision on a 
"rational basis" in an effort to protect the needs of interstate 
commerce as reflected in the statutory purposes.35 Inasmuch as 
30. Stern, Problems of Yesteryear-Commerce and Due Process, 4 VAND. L. REv. 
446, 468 (1951). 
31. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968). 
32. National League of Cities v. Dunlop, No. 74-878 (U.S. filed Jan. 17, 1975); 
California v. Brennan, No. 74-879 (U.S. filed Jan. 17, 1975). 
33. 421 U.S. 542 (1975). 
34. /d. at 548. Justice Rehnquist in dissent seeks to analyze the cases used by the 
majority to redefine the appropriate allocation of authority between state and federal 
governments and thus provide a basis in the future for overruling Maryland v. Wirtz. 
ld. at 549. 
35. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 303-04 (1964). 
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the only bill presently before Congress, House Resolution No. 
77, would amend the NLRA to remove the exemption for state 
and local employees, an examination of the purposes of the 
NLRA in the context of public sector bargaining is in order to 
determine the constitutionality of this added coverage. The act 
begins by noting: 
The denial by some employers ofthe right to organize and the 
refusal by some employers to accept the procedure of collec-
tive bargaining lead to strikes and other forms of industrial 
strife or unrest, which have the intent or the necessary effect 
of burdening or obstructing commerce .... 36 
The basic purposes of the act are to avoid or minimize this 
industrial strife and unrest, and to provide for equality of bar-
gaining power between employees and employerY 
In the private sector, the Supreme Court has ruled that fed-
eral regulation of labor relations is a proper constitutional exer-
cise of power under the commerce clause. In NLRB v. Jones & 
Laughlin Steel Corporation, 38 the Court held: 
. . . stoppage of operations by industrial strife would have a 
most serious effect upon interstate commerce .... Experi-
ence has abundantly demonstrated that the recognition of 
the right of employees to self-organization and to have repre-
sentatives of their own choosing for the purpose of collective 
bargaining is often an essential condition of industrial 
peace. 39 
The question then becomes whether Congress can, after appro-
priate investigation, conclude that labor problems that exist in 
the private sector likewise exist or may exist in the public 
sector. 
Some guidance on this issue is found in Maryland v. Wirtz, 40 
where the Court, in upholding the extension of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act to public employees, stated that "strikes and 
work stoppages involving employees of schools and hospitals, 
events which unfortunately are not infrequent, obviously inter-
36. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970). 
37. ld. 
38. 301 u.s. 1 (1937). 
39. ld. at 41-42. 
40. 392 u.s. 183 (1968). 
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rupt and burden this flow of goods across state lines."41 That 
the "flow of goods" is properly deemed substantial is apparent 
when one considers that in 1970 the interstate purchases made 
for all state and local governments amounted to an estimated 
$121 billion, or 92 percent of total state and local governmental 
expenditures. This figure represents 12.4 percent of our gross 
national product (GNP), and involved over eleven million pub-
lic employees and over three million private employees.42 
As to the point that public employee strikes can and do 
occur, it has been noted that in 1966 there were 142 work stop-
pages resulting in a total loss of 455,000 man-days of work; in 
1973, 386 work stoppages by state and local governmental em-
ployees resulted in a loss of 2,299,300 man-days of work. 43 
In the absence of federal legisation, there is significant po-
tential for labor unrest in the possible depression of wage rates 
(presumably resulting from the absence of collective bargain-
ing) by states or localities which are seeking to gain a competi-
tive advantage over their neighboring governments. Such a 
possibility may well have influenced the Court in Maryland v. 
Wirtz, where the Court noted that it was logical to infer that 
the pay and hours of employees affect the employer's competi-
tive position. 44 It is a similarly logical inference that such com-
petition presently exists between states and localities in that 
each is continually vying to attract business investments, prop-
erty development, etc.; and it is by no means unfair to observe 
41. Id. at 195. In Maryland, 87 percent of the $8 million spent for supplies and 
equipment by its public school system during the year represented direct interstate 
purchases. Id. at 194. 
42. Hearings, supra note 2, at 34. In 1971, purchases amounted to $135 billion, 
constituting 12 percent of the gross national product (GNP). 119 CoNG. REC. 14,057 
(daily ed. July 19, 1973). Of this figure, 57 percent was for compensating some 9.7 
million employees (the remaining 43 percent constituted over 5 percent of the GNP); 
and employment generated by the purchase of goods and supplies by these activities 
accounted for an additional 3.7 million jobs, making a total of 13.4 million jobs, which 
is more than 16 percent of the nation's total civilian employment. I d. For a summary 
of the effect on commerce of spending and employment by state and local government, 
see S. REP. No. 690, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). 
43. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, REPORT No. 434, WORK STOP-
PAGES IN GovERNMENT, p. 3 (1973). For a treatment of the consequences of a strike on 
strikers and on the community, see Thiebolt & Corwin, Welfare and Strikes, The Use 
of Public Funds to Support Strikers, LABOR RELATIONS AND PuBLIC POLICY SERIES, 
Report No. 6 (Wharton School of Fin. & Commerce 1972). 
44. 392 U.S. at 190. 
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that the locality with the lowest costs of public services (water, 
gas, police, trash pickup) and the lowest tax rates will be most 
attractive to the prospective investor. 45 Minimization of the 
disruptive aspects of such a competition should provide a valid, 
rational basis for legislation under the commerce clause. 46 
Another issue that arises under the application of the com-
merce clause is whether it is limited to strictly commercial 
matters, leaving governmental functions under the control of 
state sovereignty. Years ago the Supreme Court addressed this 
issue by observing that the commercial versus governmental 
quagmire involves " ... distinctions so finespun and capri-
cious as to be almost incapable of being held in the mind for 
adequate formulation" and that the courts' use of such inher-
ently unsound distinctions would only result in chaos. 47 The 
Court upheld the same principle in Maryland v. Wirtz: 
It is clear that the federal government, when acting within a 
delegated power, may override countervailing state interests 
whether these be described as 'governmental' or 'proprietary' 
in character. 48 
In view of the long history of precedents which buttress the 
Maryland v. Wirtz holding, it would appear that the authority 
of Congress under the commerce clause to pass federal bargain-
ing legislation would be within the scope of that clause; as in 
Maryland v. Wirtz establishment of minimum labor standards 
would rest on a rational basis. 49 The legal inquiry continues, 
however, as to whether the sovereignty of the states or the 
immunity of the tenth amendment provide a limitation on the 
scope of the commerce power. 
45. For detailed statistics as to the costs of such public services, see, e.g., BuREAU 
OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATE GOVERNMENT FINANCES IN 1973, Table 
No. 7, at 24-5 (1974). 
46. For discussion of the relevancy of this factor in Maryland v. Wirtz, see 392 U.S. 
at 190. 
47. Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 65, 68 (1955). For example, 
the types of activities in which government employees are engaged include work in 
hospitals, transit operations, highway construction, education and private guard serv-
ices, all, to some degree, having private sector counterparts. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR 
1971 REPORT TO CONGRESS, NONSUPERVISORY EMPLOYEES IN STATE AND LOCAL 
GovERNMENTS 52-7. 
48. 392 U.S. at 195. See also Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92, 101 (1946). 
49. 392 U.S. at 194. 
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B. State Sovereignty and the Tenth Amendment: Limitation 
on National Authority 
Even assuming that the authority of the federal government 
to regulate commerce has become nearly boundless, the ques-
tion still arises whether under our system of federalism there 
are or should be limits on the federal government's ability to 
regulate the sovereign affairs of the states. Early notions of 
"dual federalism," the concept that the tenth amendment sets 
an independent limitation on the powers of Congress and that 
national and state governments are distinct, separate, and 
impenetrable, have given way over the years to constitutional 
interpretations which have broadened the power of the federal 
government to legislate over the states.50 It has been said that 
the reason for the demise of dual federalism is not "legal but 
economic, " 51 as the economy becomes more interdependent; 
yet the basis for these constitutional interpretations was laid 
at the time the Constitution was created. James Madison, for 
example, spoke against making the tenth amendment the 
touchstone of federal legislative power: 
Interference with the power of the states was no constitu-
tional criterion of the power of Congress. If the power was not 
given, Congress could not exercise it; if given, they might 
exercise it, although it should interfere with the laws or even 
the Constitution of the States. 52 
The Supreme Court, in a long line of precedents, has main-
tained the position that the framers of the Constitution in-
tended that the commerce power "though limited to specified 
objects is plenary as to those objects,"53 and that the tenth 
amendment "does not operate as a limitation upon the powers, 
express or implied, delegated to the national govemment."54 
Though the tenth amendment has been characterized as a 
"truism," merely stating that "all is retained which has not 
50. See Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REv. 1 (1950). 
51. Sterns, Problems of Yesteryear-Commerce and Due Process, 4 VAND. L. REv. 
446, 468 (1951). 
52. II ANNALS OF CoNGRESS 1897 (1791), and quoted in Sperry v. Florida Bar, 373 
u.s. 379, 403 (1963). 
53. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 197 (1824). 
54. Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92, 102 (1946). 
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been surrendered,"55 it still may be found to have significance 
in the context of federal regulation under the commerce power. 
The Supreme Court has recently observed that the tenth 
amendment "expressly declares the constitutional policy that 
Congress may not exercise power in a fashion that impairs the 
states' integrity or their ability to function effectively in a fed-
eral system. "56 In upholding the right of the federal government 
to impose wage controls over state employees, the Court found 
that a regulation that affected the state's labor relations did 
not constitute too drastic or improper an invasion of state sov-
ereignty ,57 Yet this limitation may be difficult to define. For 
example, in Maryland v. Wirtz, the Supreme Court made the 
point that "as long ago as Sanitary District v. United States, 
266 U.S. 405, [this] Court put to rest the contention that state 
concerns might constitutionally 'outweigh' the importance of 
an otherwise valid federal statute regulating commerce."58 
A related argument is that the Court should distinguish be-
tween state governmental and non-governmental activities, 
and that only the latter should be a proper subject of federal 
legislation. The Supreme Court showed its disdain for this dis-
tinction by holding in Maryland v. Wirtz: "[i]t is clear that 
the Federal Government, when acting within a delegated 
pow~r, may override countervailing state interests whether 
these be described as 'governmenta.l' or 'proprietary' in charac-
ter . . . " 59 and "the State . . . may be forced to conform its 
activities to federal regulation."60 More recently, the Court, in 
55. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941). 
56. Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975). 
57. /d. The dissent in Fry takes a different view, noting that although the majority 
claims to find the tenth amendment to have meaning, it is difficult to show what it is. 
/d. at 550. Justice Rehnquist then cites for support the dissent of Justice Douglas in 
Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 205 (1968) which decries the apparent limitlessness 
of federal power to control commerce: "If all this can be done, then the National 
Government could devour the essentials of state sovereignty, though that sovereignty 
is attested by the Tenth Amendment." Opponents of federal regulation in National 
League of Cities v. Dunlop and California v. Brennan, supra note 10, both presently 
before the Supreme Court, maintain that Fry is not a precedent for federal regulation 
but rather is distinguishable on grounds that the existence of a national emergency 
sustains a burden of the compelling national interest in upholding th Economic Stabi-
lization Act of 1970. GERR No. 647, at B-10 (1976). 
58. 392 U.S. 183, 195-96 (1968). 
59. /d. at 195. 
60. /d. at 197. See also Parden v. Terminal R.R., 377 U.S. 184 (1964); California v. 
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discussing the ability of the federal government to regulate the 
employment relationship of state governments under the Fair 
Labor Standards Act (FLSA) stated: 
Where employees in state institutions, not conducted for 
profit, have such a relation to interstate commerce that na-
tional policy, of which Congress is the keeper, indicates that 
their status should be raised, Congress can act.81 
A final issue requiring discussion is whether federal legisla-
tion which imposes financial burdens on the states is constitu-
tionally valid. This issue has been addressed by the Supreme 
Court, which has determined that such considerations "raise 
not constitutional issues, but questions of policy. They relate 
to the wisdom, need and effectiveness of a particular project. 
They are therefore questions for the Congress, not the 
Courts. " 62 
Opponents of federal bargaining legislation maintain that 
enormous burdens will be placed on governmental employers 
by compulsory bargaining through additionally negotiated 
benefits to employees and by the added costs of administering 
a labor relations program.63 The Supreme Court, in discussing 
the cost impact of the FLSA amendments, has resolved this 
issue by holding that the validity of Congressional action under 
the commerce power is not affected by the fact that "it may 
place new or even enormous fiscal burdens on the states."64 
United States, 320 U.S. 577 (1943); United States v. Caiifornia, 297 U.S. 175 (1936); 
Board of Trustees ofUniv. of Ill. v. United States, 289 U.S. 48 (1933). 
61. Employees v. Missouri Public Health Dep't, 411 U.S. 279 (1973). 
62. Oklahoma v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, 527 (1941). The Court added, 
"[N]or is it for us to determine whether the resulting benefits to commerce as a result 
of this particular exercise by Congress of the commerce power outweigh the costs of 
the undertaking." ld. at 528. See also Sanitary Dist. v. United States, 266 U.S. 405, 
432 (1925). 
63. For a discussion of some of the possible implications of compulsory bargaining 
in the public sector and its costs, particularly in loss of sovereignty, see Petro, 
Sovereignty and Compulsory Public-Sector Bargaining, 10 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 25 
(1974). 
64. Employees v. Missouri Public Health Dep't, 411 U.S. 279 (1973). It should also 
be noted that, while on the one hand the federal government imposes fiscal burdens, 
it also provides much funding. In 1975, federal aid to state and local governments is 
estimated to total approximately $52 billion and will finance about 22 percent of state 
and local expenditures. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE 
PRESIDENT, SPECIAL ANALYSES, BUDGET OF THE U.S. Gov'T, 203, 205 (1974). 
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C. Eleventh Amendment as Possible Limitation on National 
Authority 
As discussed above, Congress has broad legislative powers 
based on the commerce clause which limit the power that the 
states had until that power was delegated to the federal govern-
ment under the Constitution.65 By this delegation the states 
necessarily relinquished any part of their sovereignty that 
would stand in the way of such regulation. 56 However, a ques-
tion arises as to what effect, if any, the eleventh amendment 
has in providing a possible constitutional immunity to the 
applicability of federal legislation to the statesY To a certain 
extent the eleventh amendment, even though directed to judi-
cial power, does limit congressional power under the com-
merce clause. The eleventh amendment state immunity pro-
hibits Congress in some cases from providing federal jurisdic-
tion over violations of a citizen's federal rights by the states. 68 
Though the precise nature and effects of the eleventh amend-
ment are often difficult to define, certain conclusions can be 
reached as to its potential impact on federal bargaining legisla-
tion. 59 The recent holding in Employees v. Missouri Depart-
ment of Health & Welfare made clear that Congress has the 
constitutional power under the commerce clause to legislate in 
the area of labor standards applied to public employers. 70 
Speaking for the majority, Justice Douglas found no constitu-
tional impediments to Congress' regulating the states in their 
capacity as employers under the FLSA. He noted that the 
"states surrendered a portion of their sovereignty when they 
granted Congress the power to regulate commerce."71 The issue 
of the case, however, was whether employees could sue their 
state employers in·the absence of a clear expression that Con-
65. See Parden v. Terminal R.R., 377 U.S. 184, 191 (1964). 
66. ld. at 192. 
67. "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to 
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States 
by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CoNST. amend. XI. 
68. For a complete treatment of the origins and evolution of the eleventh amend-
ment, see C. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY (1972). 
69. See, e.g., Comment, The Elusive Eleventh Amendment and the Perimeters of 
Federal Power, 46 U. Cow. L. REv. 211 (1974). 
70. 411 U.S. 279, 282-86 (1973). 
71. /d. at 286, quoting Parden v. Terminal R.R., 377 U.S. at 191. 
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gress intended to lift the nonconsenting states' usual immuni-
ties from suit by a private citizen when brought in the federal 
courts. The Court ruled that despite the plenary power of Con-
gress over commerce, congressional intent to lift the immunity 
provided by the eleventh amendment was not to be implied, 
but must be express. 72 Justice White, dissenting in Parden, also 
agreed that "only when Congress has ... expressly declared 
that any State which undertakes given regulable conduct will 
be deemed thereby to have waived its immunity should courts 
disallow the invocation of this defense."73 Thus, the cases indi-
cate that, by express provision, Congress may lift the states' 
immunities. 
Nevertheless, the question is not so easily resolved. Though 
immunities can be waived vis-a-vis the federal government's 
right to sue, the constitutional amendment appears clearly to 
prohibit suits by citizens against the states in federal courts. 
The Court in Employees stated: 
By holding that Congress did not lift the sovereign immunity 
of the States under the FLSA, we do not make the extension 
of coverage to state employees meaningless. . .. [The Act] 
gives the Secretary of Labor authority to bring suit .... 
Suits by the United States are not barred by the Constitu-
tion. 7~ 
In Edelman u. Jordan, the Court held that the eleventh amend-
ment was violated when a decree in a suit by a private citizen 
ordered the state to make retroactive welfare payments. 75 How-
ever, the Court again distinguished it from a suit which is 
brought on behalf of the United States.76 In sum, the federal 
government has constitutional authority under the commerce 
power to legislate over the states and to sue them for violations; 
and it is not limited by any eleventh amendment immunities. 
However, it also appears that the federal courts remain without 
72. The Court added that Congress can "readily repair the deficiency ... by simply 
amending the Act expressly to declare that a State that engages in an enterprise 
covered by the 1966 amendments shall be amenable to suit under § 16 (b) in federal 
court." Employees v. Missouri Public Health Dep't, 411 U.S. 279, 308-09 (1973). 
73. 377 U.S. at 198-99. 
74. 411 U.S. 279, 285-86. See also United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 140-
41 (1972). 
75. 415 u.s. 651, 669 (1974). 
76. ld. 
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jurisdiction to entertain suits by private citizens against the 
states notwithstanding dicta in the Employees case. 77 
An obvious way to avoid this apparent limitation on federal 
legislative remedies is for Congress to establish that federal 
rights will be redressed in state courts. Indeed, there is preced-
ent for this simple solution; 7R and the argument that states may 
have an obligation to provide a forum for the vindication of 
federal rights under the supremacy clause of the Constitution 
has some validity. 79 
The possible limitation of remedies under federal legislation 
does not affect the constitutionality of the act. In Maryland v. 
Wirtz, the Court held: 
The constitutionality of applying the substantive require-
ments of the Act to the States is not, in our view, affected by 
the possibility that one or more remedies the Act provides 
might not be available when a State is the employer-
defendant. Ko 
The relevancy of the above discussion of available remedies 
to the issue of the constitutionality of federal bargaining legis-
lation may be minimal when it is recalled that states have, for 
the most part, consented in employment contracts to sue and 
be sued, and that most contract claims are necessarily brought 
in state court. However, drafters of federal legislation would 
need to provide proper forums for suit and remedies, especially 
in view of possible federal preemption problems and other re-
lated and unrelated constitutional implications raised by fed-
eral bargaining legislation. 
77. See note 72, supra. Of course, public officials under section 1983 can be enjoined 
from prospectively violating the law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970); see Edelman v. Jordan, 
4Ifi U.S. 651, 67.'\-77 (1973). 
78. Clover Bottom Hosp. & School v. Townsend, 513 S.W.2d 505 (Tenn. 1974); Glick 
v. Montana, 509 P.2d 1 (Mont. 1973). 
79. Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947). See generally Hart, The Power of Congress 
to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REv. 
1362 (1953). It may also be possible for the Government to sue as the party in interest 
for the benefit of the private citizen. See also United States Fidelity v. Kenyon, 204 
u.s. 349, 357 (1907). 
80. 392 U.S. 183, 200 (1968). The Court added, "Percolating through each of [the 
Act's! provisions for relief are interests of the United States and problems of immun-
ity, agency, and consent to suit .... They are almost impossible and most unneces-
sary to resolve in advance of particular facts, stated claims, and identified plaintiffs 
and defendants." ld. 
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III. REMAINING CoNSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS 
Assuming that constitutional authority exists for Congress to 
pass federal bargaining legislation, certain issues having con-
stitutional implications do arise and should be carefully exam-
ined and resolved prior to enactment. It is the purpose of this 
section to raise some of the issues and their implications rather 
than to provide definitive analysis or judgments regarding their 
desired or probable resolution, a task best left to separate un-
dertakings and/or legislative inquiry. 
The constitutional obligations of state and local employers 
flow of course from their being governmental employers. That 
is, constitutional duties are owed by government, not only to 
its citizens, but also to its employees. Innumerable conflicts 
arise in public sector labor relations which have constitutional 
dimensions. Two recurring problems with constitutional impli-
cations are those involving (1) associational and equal protec-
tion rights and duties, and (2) preemption. 
A. First and Fourteenth Amendment Rights and Duties 
A myriad of possible conflicts involving first and fourteenth 
amendment rights arise in the public sector. For example, it 
has been shown that public employees have a constitutional 
right to organize and form unions and to be free from employer 
discrimination because of such organization. But what is the 
extent of the public employer's right to limit such conduct or 
to accord different treatment to competing unions (e.g., denial 
of dues check-off) or to deny or permit a meeting with a 
statutorily defined "non-exclusive" employee representative? 
Even absent statutory proscription, the Courts have, to a 
large extent, created a constitutionally based system of unfair 
employer practices. For example, public employees may not be 
dismissed or disciplined for a lawful exercise of their first 
amendment rights to associate or assemble. 81 In organizational 
campaigns the employer retains free speech rights and may 
actively provide persuasive information on the relative merits 
81. E.g., AFSCME v. Woodward, 406 F.2d 137 (8th Cir. 1969); McLaughlin v. Tilen· 
dis, 398 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1968); Atkins v. City of Charlotte, 296 F. Supp. 1068 
(W.D.N.C. 1969). 
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of unionismx2 or of one union over another; he may deny institu-
tional advantages such as the use of school mailboxes during 
an organizational campaign, or prohibit solicitation on behalf 
of a union (within certain limitations).83 However, the employ-
ers' conduct may be proscribed not only for exceeding his law-
ful interests in regulating first amendment conduct, 84 but also 
for violating the proscriptions of the fourteenth amendment. 
The fourteenth amendment prohibits discriminatory treat-
ment of similarly situated classes of citizens without valid rea-
sons for the classification.85 The courts have enforced this re-
quirement by requiring employers to treat competing unions 
equally during pre-election periods; if, for example, the em-
ployer grants institutional advantages to one competitor, he 
cannot deny that privilege to other competitors.86 Decisions 
have also established constitutional criteria for determining 
the validity of no-solicitation rulesY 
Two cases in public sector labor relations with constitutional 
dimensions are currently before the Supreme Court. The first 
deals with a public employer's meeting only with a statutorily 
recognized exclusive bargaining agent, when other employee or 
citizen groups wished to meet with the employer to discuss 
matters within the scope of bargainable subjects.88 The Wis-
82. See Friedman v. Union Free School Dist. No. 1, Town oflslip, 314 F. Supp. 223 
(E.D.N.Y. 1970); Los Angeles Teachers Union, AFT Local 1021 v. City Bd. of Educ., 
71 Cal. 2d 551, 445 P.2d 827, 78 Cal. Rptr. 723 (1969). For the same principle in the 
private sector, see NLRB v. Armco Drainage & Metal Prods., Inc., 220 F.2d 573 (6th 
Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 838 (1955). 
83. See Friedman v. Union Free School Dist. No.1, Town oflslip, 314 F. Supp. 223 
(E.D.N.Y. 1970). 
84. See Tinker v. Des Moines Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
85. U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV; for general discussion see Nowak, Realigning the 
Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection Guarantee-Prohibited, Neutral, 
and Permissive Classifications, 62 GEo. L.J. 1071 (1974). 
86. As discussed earlier, the use of institutional advantages, e.g., school mailboxes, 
may be limited, but once they are made available to one union it will usually be 
unconstitutional to deny use to another union, absent authorizing legislation. See, e.g., 
Local 1880, AFT v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 355 F. Supp. 594 (N.D. Fla. 1973); Dade 
County Classroom Teachers Ass'n v. Ryan, 225 So.2d 903 (Fla. 1969). 
87. See Tinker v. Des Moines Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Fried-
man v. Union Free School Dist. No.1, Town oflslip, 314 F. Supp. 223 (E.D.N.Y. 1970). 
88. City of Madison Joint School Dist. No. 8 v. W.E.R.C., 69 Wis.2d 200, 231 
N.W.2d 206 (1975), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3400 (U.S. Jan. 5, 1976) (No. 
946). See Note, The Privilege of Exclusive Recognition and Minority Union Rights in 
Public Employment, 55 CORNELL L. REv. 1004 (1970). 
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consin Supreme Court found in this case that first amendment 
rights were subordinate to the legislative interest in maintain-
ing a collective bargaining system. 
The second case involves the power of a governmental em-
ployer to distinguish between union and non-union payroll 
deductions and to permit the latter while denying the former. 89 
The Fourth Circuit upheld the district court's injunction for-
bidding the city to refuse to withhold union dues under its 
check-off procedures; that court also determined that under 
the fourteenth amendment it would be difficult, albeit possi-
ble, for a public employer to discriminate in a constitutionally 
permissible way between payroll deductions for union dues and 
other payroll deductions. 90 
An ever present issue in discu!';sions of public sector unionism 
is the right to strike. If the National Labor Relations Act were 
amended so as to apply to public employees, such a right would 
exist just as it does for private employees. However, the politi-
cal realities are such that although it is open to considerable 
debate, it is extremely probable that a modification would re-
sult so as either to ban strikes or to provide a substitute mecha-
nism such as binding interest arbitration.91 Strike bans have 
repeatedly been upheld as the courts find that a constitutional 
right to strike does not exist. 92 Likewise, courts have had little 
difficulty in finding that interest arbitration, when limited by 
appropriate standards, is constitutional and not an illegal dele-
gation of constitutional authority. 93 These constitutional issues 
89. City of Charlotte v. Firefighters Local660, 381 F. Supp. 500 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. 
granted, 44 U.S.L.W. 3228 (U.S. Oct. 14, 1975) (No. 250). 
90. ld. at 2609. 
91. For example, see Postal Reorganization Act of 1970, where postal employees 
were granted rights substantially the same as those guaranteed private sector employ-
ees under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), except for the right to strike. 39 
U.S.C. §§ 1201-09 (1970). 
92. The constitutionality of strike bans is illustrated in United Fed'n of Postal 
Clerks v. Blount, 325 F. Supp. 879 (D.D.C. 1971); aff'd mem., 404 U.S. 802 (1971); and 
Anderson Fed'n of Teachers Local519 v. School City of Anderson, 252 Ind. 558, 251 
N.E.2d 15 (1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 928 (1970). For discussion of the prevalence 
of interest arbitration, see Brown, supra note 8, at 703-05. 
93. See McAvoy, Binding Arbitration of Contract Terms: A New Approach to the 
Resolution of Disputes in the Publi~ Sector, 72 COLUM. L. REv. 1192 (1972); Note, 
Legality and Propriety of Agreements to Arbitrate Major and Minor Disputes in Public 
Employment, 54 CoRNELL L. REv. 129 (1968). However, a recent decision in New York 
held unconstitutional as a violation of the one-vote principle a New York statute 
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must be considered in formulating appropriate federal bargain-
ing legislation and, if possible, accommodated to the constitu-
tional requirements of governmental employers. 
B. Possible Impact of Preemption on the States 
In view of the expansive reach and supremacy of federal law 
passed under the authority of the commerce clause as applied 
to state laws, it is evident that there is a pressing need for 
examining the possible impact of federal preemption on the 
structures of state and local government. Commentators have 
predicted that if the prevailing private sector law on preemp-
tion is followed in the public sector it "may create widespread 
confusion and uncertainty; jeopardize important management 
rights and employee benefits; threaten the stability and 
viability of retirement funds; and lead to widespread and costly 
litigation."94 Therefore, it is urged that a comprehensive sum-
mary analysis of all state and local laws should be a prerequis-
ite to passage of federal legislation.95 The fear of preemption 
and the need for such "summary analysis" is vigorously decried 
by other commentators who claim that the doctrine of preemp-
tion is manageable and that any such study would be useless 
and of little assistance to Congress. 96 
To understand the potential impact of preemption on the 
states it is necessary to examine briefly the private sector pre-
cedents to establish a proper framework within which implica-
tions on the public sector can be discussed. The preemption 
doctrine originates with the interplay between the authority of 
Congress to legislate under its delegated powers and the tenth 
amendment's reserving to the states powers not delegated to 
the federal government. The question becomes, as between fed-
eral and state law on the same subject, which shall prevail. If 
opposing arbitration in police and firefighters' disputes. City of Amsterdam v. Helsby, 
79 Misc. 2d 677, 362 N.Y.S.2d 698 (Sup. Ct. 1974). 
94. Statement by Dr. Myron Lieberman of Baruch College, City University of New 
York. GERR No. 593, B-3 (1975). 
95. Lieberman, Memorandum Analysis of Preemption Problems with Proposed Fed-
eral Bargaining Legislation for State/Local Employees, GERR No. 593, at E-2 (1975). 
96. Chanin & Snyder, The Bugaboo of Federal Preemption: An Analysis of the 
Relationship Between a Federal Collective Bargaining Statute for Employees of State 
and Local Governments and State Statutes Affecting Such Employees, 3 FLA. ST. U .L. 
REv. 236, 256 n.71 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Chanin & Snyder]. 
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there is a direct and irreconcilable conflict the federal law 
clearly prevails under the supremacy clause of the Constitu-
tion.97 
The choice facing Congress as it seeks to legislate in an area 
heretofore covered by state legislation is whether to respond to 
the issue expressly or to leave it to a case-by-case determina-
tion. us If the legislative intent is not clear then the judiciary will 
have to determine whether Congress intended to displace coin-
cident state regulation in a given area. 99 The leading private 
sector case explaining the doctrine of preemption is San Diego 
Building Trades Council u. Garmon, 100 where the Court in in-
terpreting the NLRA held that Congress intended to assume 
exclusive jurisdiction over activity "arguably protected or pro-
hibited" by the Act and that state regulation is permitted only 
where the activity is of "peripheral concern" to the federal 
policy or involves interests "deeply rooted in local feeling and 
responsi hili ty." 101 
The effect of the application of that doctrine in the public 
sector, in the context of a federal b.argaining law, enjoys only 
sparce public sector precedent. Authors Chanin and Snyder in 
an article on the subject of preemption categorize the implica-
tions into three areas: 102 (1) state statutes in conflict with the 
federal statutes; 103 (2) state collective bargaining statutes; and 
97. U.S. CoNST. art. VI, cl. 2. See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 
holding that no judicial inquiry into congressional design is necessary "where compli-
ance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility .... " 373. U.S. 
132, 142-43 (1963). See also Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 548 (1975). 
98. The Fair Labor Standards Act expressly provided that state and local govern-
ments must comply with the federal law, and any inconsistent laws would therefore 
be invalid. Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 218(a) (1970). The NLRA, on the 
other hand, was silent on preemptive effect and left to the courts the arduous task of 
case-by-case analysis. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970). 
99. See, e.g., Beasley v. Food Fair, 416 U.S. 653 (1974). 
100. 359 U.S. 236 (1959). See also Note, Federal Preemption: Government Interests 
and the Role of the Supreme Court, 1966 DuKE L.J. 484. 
101. 359 U.S. at 243-44. A broader rationale for preemption rooted in a conflict of 
state law with a uniform national labor policy intended by Congress, permits a court 
to find preemption more easily than in Garmon. See Teamsters Local 20 v. Morton, 
377 U.S. 252, 260 (1964); Garner v. Teamsters Local 776, 345 U.S. 485 (1953). For a 
thorough discussion of the area, see generally Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 
85 HARv. L. REv. 1337 (1972). 
102. Chanin & Snyder, supra note 96, at 236. 
103. As was discussed under the supremacy clause and cases like Fry v. United 
States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975), there is no doubt that direct conflicts will be resolved by 
upholding the federal statute. 
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(3) state statutes' establishing terms and conditions of public 
employment. 
The implication of preemption on existing state bargaining 
legislation, absent express congressional intent, is that state 
legislation would be displaced inasmuch as it would fall within 
the private sector Garmon rule, i.e., the rights affected would 
arguably be protected or prohibited by the federal law .104 
The most difficult area in which to assess implications of 
preemption deals with the effect a federal bargaining law might 
have on state statutes which establish terms and conditions of 
employment. In 1957 the Supreme Court, in California v. 
Taylor, 105 held that a state-operated railroad was subject to the 
Federal Railway Labor Act, which permitted employee bar-
gaining notwithstanding a state statute prohibiting it. 106 The 
Court added that the negotiated collective bargaining agree-
ment "would take precedence over conflicting provisions of the 
state civil service laws." 107 A later case amplified the import of 
that statement when the Court held that a state law cannot be 
applied to prevent "the contracting parties from carrying out 
their agreement upon a subject matter as to which federal law 
directs them to bargain." 108 Thus, it appears clear that preced-
ent exists for the displacement of many state statutes by the 
preemptive effects of the federal bargaining law. 109 On the 
highly provocative question of whether all state statutes estab-
lishing terms and conditions would be invalidated by the mere 
passage of a federal bargaining law, i.e., even before execution 
of an inconsistent agreement, an argument exists that to hold 
104. 359 u.s. 236 (1959). 
105. 353 u.s. 553 (1957). 
106. /d. at 559-67. This conclusion would likewise follow under the Garner rationale 
discussed supra note 101. 
107. California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553, 561 (1957). 
108. Teamsters Local 24 v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283, 295 (1959); the Court added that 
to hold otherwise "would defeat the full realization of the congressional purpose ... 
[andl frustrate the parties' solution of a problem which Congress has required them 
to negotiate in good faith toward solving, and has imposed no limitations relevant 
here." /d. at 295-96. The Court provided that exceptions to this preemption could exist, 
as for example, "local health or safety regulations" might prevail. For discussion of 
this issue as it could relate to public employees, see Chanin & Snyder, supra note 96, 
at 247. 
109. For an analogous case see Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. Commonwealth Dep't of 
Labor and Indus., 12 Pa. 292, 314 A.2d 862 (1974). 
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otherwise would improperly fetter what is statutorily required 
to be free and open bargaining. There is a paucity of case law 
on this issue and any tentative conclusions would be only spec-
ulative and premature. 110 
In summary the constitutional implications of constitution-
ally authorized federal bargaining legislation are of sufficient 
magnitude to warrant heightened concern and precise legisla-
tive drafting so as to minimize potential adverse or undesired 
effects. 
IV. FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE OPPORTUNITIES 
In allocating power between the national and state govern-
ments the Supreme Court has made clear that national power 
predominates in the field of regulating commerce. The consti-
tutional basis for regulating the labor relations of the states is 
likewise clear. Arguments that such legislation will cut too 
deeply into state sovereignty and policy decision-making lose 
much of their force when consideration is given to the sub-
stance of proposed federal legislation which would require the 
parties to engage in employment contract negotiations within 
and under the guidance of a statutory scheme, just as is pres-
ently done in nearly forty states, and that neither party must 
agree to terms or capitulate to unreasonable terms any more 
than is done absent federal legislation. 111 
Should Congress deem federal bargaining legislation desira-
ble, specific legislative opportunities now exist to shape it in 
such a way as to accommodate the competing tenets of federal-
ism and to minimize the anticipated constitutional difficulties. 
First of all, the constitutional difficulties created by the fact 
that governmental employers, as government, must observe 
first and fourteenth amendment requirements are of no greater 
complexity than those which presently occur under state bar-
110. For speculation on this issue, see Chanin & Snyder, supra note 96, at 248-54. 
111. For example, the NLRA imposes an obligation to bargain but specifically states 
that "such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require 
the making of a concession .... " 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1970). Indeed some public employ-
ers have opted for federal coverage under the NLRA so as to gain access to procedures 
and remedies against union unfair labor practices not available under state statutes. 
See Ferguson, Collective Bargaining in Universities and Colleges, 19 LAB. L.J. 778, 784 
(1968). See generally D. STANLEY, MANAGING LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNDER UNION 
PRESSURE (1972); H. WELLINGTON & R. WINTER, JR., THE UNIONS AND THE CITIES (1971 ). 
152 Oklahoma City University Law Review [Vol. I 
gaining statutory schemes. Interestingly, the results of much of 
the pre-election constitutional litigation parallel the NLRB 
precedents governing unfair labor practices, e.g., employers are 
limited to nondiscriminatory treatment of competing unions in 
granting advantages. Additional case law regulating no-
solicitation rules also shows that a balanci:vg of first amend-
ment rights in effect provides much the same type of regulation 
permitted under the NLRA. The appropriate relationship be-
tween exclusive recognition and the rights of employee-citizens 
to petition their government will undergo Supreme Court re-
view this session; and it is likely that a result similar to the 
NLRA proscription guaranteeing employee access to the em-
ployer will be approved although the public employee's rights 
may well need to be held more absolute. 112 These difficulties 
can best be minimized through federal legislation, which could 
take cognizance of the constitutional obligations of public em-
ployers and direct administrative interpretations to comport 
with them. 
On the issue of preemption and the best method by which 
to achieve an appropriate balance between federal and state 
policy, it is clearly preferable for Congress to state its intention 
expressly. This would preclude considerable litigation and per-
mit bargaining to commence within clear guidelines, prevent-
ing the private sector preemption analogies from clouding is-
sues of bargainable subjects such as terms and conditions of 
employment. Many options are available to Congress in adopt-
ing an express policy concerning the preemptive effect of a 
collective bargaining statute for public employees. The possi-
bilities range from total invalidation of state laws establishing 
terms and conditions of public employment to a policy which 
would not invalidate any such provisions. 113 Other options in-
clude permitting statutes to remain unaffected unless su-
perseded by collective bargaining agreements, 114 permitting 
112. While this would not be applicable to access for "statutory bargaining" pur-
poses, it would apply to access for individual grievances. The NLRA typifies state 
statutory provisions which preserve the rights of individuals to present grievances to 
their employers. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970). 
113. See Chanin & Snyder~ supra note 96, at 256. 
114. Most statutes which have considered the problem of potentially conflicting 
statutory provisions such as civil service laws as a limitation on the scope of bargaining 
have provided that civil service legislation takes precedence. See Brown, supra note 8, 
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statutes to remain valid but susceptible to being supplemented 
by agreement, or to undertake specifically by legislation (or to 
authorize by administrative interpretation) the selection of 
those types of statutes which would be valid or invalid (i.e., 
defining the scope of bargaining to permit or deny negotiation 
on such subjects as personal leave or retirement) .115 The ulti-
mate decision necessarily requires legislative judgment; how-
ever, in considering the options this author ,would submit that 
there are clearly preferable courses to follow which would mini-
mize potential litigation and better accommodate the needs of 
federalism. 
That Congress has the constitutional authority to create fed-
eral bargaining legislation does not mean that it should exer-
cise it to the fullest extent possible. The values of federalism 
remain viable and while a uniform approach and legislative 
structure appear desirable, the appeal of diversity and permit-
ting the state and local governments to develop and maintain 
their own labor relations schemes, so as to minimize the impact 
on their legislative and constitutional.structures, also remains 
highly desirable. The objective of any federal bargaining legis-
lation is to provide certain minimum standards which guide 
and govern the parties in their negotiations. Therefore, it ap-
pears that it is possible to accommodate some of the legitimate 
state interests (sovereignty) in retained control of labor rela-
tions, while simultaneously protecting certain minimum bar-
gaining rights on a uniform basis. This can be accomplished by 
establishing a system of federal-state regulation under a 
minimum standards collective bargaining statute. 116 
This system would delineate basic guidelines for public sec-
tor labor relations, reserving ultimate administrative authority 
at 702 n.82. See also Comment, The Civil Service-Collective Bargaining Conflict in 
the Public Sector: Attempts at Reconciliation, 38 U. CHt. L. REv. 826 (1971). Michigan, 
on the other hand, took a different course when the Michigan Supreme Court held that 
those sections of the civil service laws dealing with mandatory subjects of bargaining 
under the collective bargaining laws were superseded pro tanto by the latter legislation. 
Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Wayne County Bd. of Supervisors, 348 Mich. 363, 184 N.W.2d 
201 (1971). 
115. Of course, the NLRB is not beyond performing such a task and has heen 
defining mandatory and non-mandatory bargaining subjects for many years. See, e.p., 
NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958);· Note, The Scope of Collectit•e 
Bargaining, 74 YALE L.J. 1472 (1965). 
116. See Brown, supra note 8, at 716-20. 
154 Oklahoma City University Law Review [Vol. I 
to the federal government but allowing the states broad discre-
tion to fashion rules of implementation and to experiment with 
innovative provisions in substantive areas such as scope of bar-
gaining117 and impasse resolution. This act would provide all 
state and local employees with certain "minimum standards" 
of essential bargaining rights, 118 and would. provide that any 
state or local governmental unit with a law in "substantial 
conformity" or the "substantial equivalent" would be given the 
authority to administer its own law, subject only to federal 
administrative review.l 19 Noncomplying states would be sub-
ject to a comprehensive federal statute administered by a fed-
eral agency. 
The advantages of this system are obvious. It minimizes the 
basic antagonism of those who resist federal encroachment 
upon state labor relations; it reduces the potential burden of 
federal administrative machinery; and it promotes diversity in 
reaching solutions to the complex problems facing state and 
local governments in their labor relations. Additionally, the 
constitutional implications of preemption would be minimized 
(assuming compliance by the states) and in situations necessi-
tating an examination of the preemptive effects of federal legis-
lation, clearly expressed congressional intent with respect to 
the reach by the federal government into matters such as bar-
gainable subjects would provide clear guidance and stability to 
public sector bargaining relationships. To lessen the disruptive 
effects of a new federal bargaining law, it would seem prefera-
ble that Congress consider, as the proper stance on the preemp-
tion issue, permitting present statutes concerning terms and 
117. As discussed, some legislative guidance as to the preemptive effects, if any, on 
the mandatory subjects of bargaining would be needed. 
118. The essential minimum standards should include at least the recognition of the 
right to organize and bargain; creation of an administrative agency to make determina-
tions on appropriate bargaining units, representation questions, unfair labor practices, 
and impasse resolution; guidelines providing for secret ballot elections and exclusive 
recognition; mandatory bargainin'g in good faith obligations; and binding grievance 
arbitration. For more complete treatment see Brown, supra note 8, at 718. For support 
of this approach see Chanin & Snyder, supra note 96, at 262. 
119. A variation of this approach could be used as is done by the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission to permit deferral by the federal agency to the state agency. 
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1970), .as amended, (Supp. II, 1972); and implementing 
regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12 (1975). This deferral arrangement was upheld by the 
Supreme Court in Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522 (1972). 
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conditions to remain valid though subject to supplementation 
by a negotiated agreement. Admittedly, this places a burden 
on the public employer, who must begin bargaining with a 
statutorily-created minimum benefit package which would 
permit public employees additionally to attempt to gain bene-
fits through both political action or the collective bargaining 
process. An alternative is to invalidate state employee benefit 
statutes, if that is legally and politically possible. These are 
difficult decisions and one can be assured that any new federal 
collective bargaining law will be the result of legislative com-
promise. The result of that compromise will be benefited by a 
full understanding of the constitutional implications of 
preemption and the available legislative options for creative 
legislation on the subject. 120 
120. Essential to making certain the statutory scheme works is the assurance that 
it will be adequately funded. This could be accomplished by legislative direction, e.g., 
making it a criterion of "substantial equivalency," or by tying such a condition to the 
grant of federal funds. Presently under the Urban Mass Transit Act, 49 U.S.C. § 
1609(3)(c) (1970) federal money is made available to public transit agencies which were 
formerly privately owned with the condition that the employees, now public, be per-
mitted to bargain like their private sector counterparts with the exception that strikes 
are banned and binding interest arbitration is substituted therefor. In a state which 
did not otherwise authorize public sector bargaining, authorizing legislation was 
needed to qualify for the funds, and is usually passed. See, e.g., VA. CoDE § 15.1-1357.2 
(1974). Of course, more sophisticated grant inducements can be designed to meet the 
special needs of a federal collective bargaining statute. 
121. On June 24, 1976, the Supreme Court decided the National League of Cities v. 
Dunlop case on a date too late to permit integration into this publication. The ruling 
is significant in that it appears to have halted the easy and automatic expansion of 
federal powers over commerce where it interferes with state sovereignty. In a 5-4 
decision, the majority said it did riot believe the reasoning of Maryland v. Wirtz "may 
any longer be regarded as authoritative." It was held that Congress may not exercise 
its power under the commerce clause "so as to force directly upon the states its choices 
as to how essential decisions regarding the conduct of integral government functions 
are to be made" because to do so would "allow the national government to devour the 
essentials of state sovereignty." The Court did not accept the tenth amendment argu-
ment. The dissent questioned the majority's legal basis and said it appeared in "dero-
gation of the sovereign power of the nation to regulate commerce." 
Whether this holding is distinguishable from federal legislation regulating state and 
local collective bargaining remains to be seen, but it can be observed that the FLSA 
impo8ed wage-and-hour requirements on governmental employers whereas the bar-
gaining legislation would require only that certain procedures be followed and nothing 
specifically must be agreed to. Additionally, a minimum-standards-legislation ap-
proach as suggested in this article would minimize the unconstitutional aspects. N.Y. 
Time8, Jun. 25, 1976, at 1, col. 8. 
